Int. Journal of Business Science and Applied Management / Business-and-Management.org
develops substantially (improving roughly fivefold) over the first few months following birth, before
fine-tuning the system over the ensuing six years (Maurer & Lewis, 2001). However, if the visual
system is perturbed during this critical developmental period (e.g. by congenital blindness or cataracts)
then the primary visual cortex fails to re-organise and arrange itself normally, and in some cases can
even be taken over by sensory inputs coming from other modalities such as touch or sound (Maurer et
al., 2005). As the individual matures, the ability of the brain to undertake remodelling and
reorganization on such a large scale declines. Thus, the majority of experience-dependent learning
needs to be undertaken, with accompanying resource allocation, during the early periods of an
individual‟s life, as it cannot be adequately compensated for at a later date.
An understanding of the critical periods present during the successful growth and development of
the brain, alongside an appreciation of the consequences of failure to provide environmental exposure
during these periods, has potentially important insights for organizational development. Although many
different models of the organizational life cycle (OLC) have been proposed (e.g. Lippitt & Schmidt,
1967; Miller & Friesen, 1980; Greiner, 1998), many share the concepts of organizational creation/birth
and growth preceding maturity (Lester, 2004). Similarly, many models imply that a failure to undergo
developmental processes required to establish a mature organization with a good environmental fit and
the capacity to respond to important sensory stimuli results in the high numbers of companies that fail
to last beyond 12 to 18 months from the time of their creation (Quinn & Cameron, 1983).
Of particular note, the high levels of resources available to the developing brain after birth (e.g.
energy, number of contributing cells) have been found to be of critical importance, allowing the initial
(pre-natal) over-elaboration of contacts and functions before subsequent post-natal sculpting occurs.
Translation of these insights to the organizational perspective suggests that resource allocation during
creation and early growth phases of the OLC is likely to be critical to success (Buenstorf & Witt,
2006). Thus, an organization looking to take advantage of neuroanatomical principles would require
the ability to commit significant resourcing to ensure that, at its conception, it has more resources than
may eventually be required. This is especially the case for „softer‟ resources like management
experience and commitment, time and creative space, as well as the more conventional resources of
superior market intelligence, appropriate personnel, innovative products and services, efficient outputs
and effective networks of inter-organizational connections (Lester, 2004). These facilitate the all-
important freedoms to subsequently undergo „developmental remodelling‟ in response to both internal
and external environmental pressures and opportunities that are unlikely to be fully anticipated or
predicted before launch. In this way, an organization has the potential to be more successful in its
growth and early maturity phases because it has allowed itself to be shaped by the real pressures of the
turbulent business world it inhabits, rather than trying to „shoe-horn‟ a „one trick pony‟ or „one size fits
all‟ offering into a predetermined fixed structure, planned before creation, into a business environment
where it does not ideally fit.
An illustration of the potential effectiveness of this approach to „developmental remodelling‟ is
provided by the evolution of JetBlue Airways and its „value-based model‟ (Flouris & Oswald, 2006;
Fiorini, 2002). Neeleman, JetBlue‟s founder, having already experienced the trials and tribulations of
starting a new airline – Morris Air Service – which was subsequently sold to Southwest, was then
employed by Southwest during which the idea of JetBlue was born. The four factors which appeared
crucial were: the prior experience gained when creating a minor airline; the valuable learning gained
whilst at Southwest; the ability to attract and adapt mature airline talent to a new corporate concept
prior to start-up; and finally, perhaps most crucially, the reflective evaluation of the reasons behind the
failed growth strategy of the path-breaking low-cost US carrier PEOPLExpress (Wynbrandt, 2004;
Peterson & Glab, 1995) – and a recognition of the resourcing requirements necessary for creating a
value-based service: innovation (in the sense of „doing things differently‟ to competitors), flexibility,
speed of response and a sense of intimacy with employees and customers alike.
An apposite organizational illustration of the sort of „developmental remodelling‟ that the brain
undergoes is provided by the European low cost airline easyJet. In the early 1990s, its founder, Stelios
Haji-Ioannou, saw the potential not only for a European version of the highly successful Southwest
Airlines but the opportunity created by the liberalisation of European skies and the challenge that could
be made to the high-cost incumbent airlines‟ dominance in key markets. As Kumar (2004) points out,
the creation of easyJet was not simply a case of the right person being in the right place at the right
time but, more significantly, the ability of Haji-Ioannou to develop a truly transformational initiative –
a strongly marketing-led strategy based not on conventional market segmentation but on strategic
segmentation. As both Kumar (2004) and Rae (2001) illustrate, easyJet as an organization, the „easyJet
model‟ (Sull, 1999) and its founder – like Neeleman and JetBlue - have been the subject of and subject
to a continuous evolutionary process of refining, sculpting and rewiring since its conception – perhaps
a classic case of organizational fluidity and the importance of environmental exposure during