Caspar Rose, Peter Munch-Madsen and Maja Funch
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1 INTRODUCTION
The issue of board diversity, especially regarding the impact of increasing the proportion of women as well
as non-nationals in corporate boards has gained much attention, not only among policy makers, but also among
academics and the financial media. The reason is that women and non-nationals are relatively seldom appointed
as board members. For example, despite of the fact that the average number of board women in European
corporations has increased from 5 to 8.4 percent from 2001-07 the low level is still a challenge; see Heidrick
and Struggles (2007). Even though most people agree that current female proportions of corporate boards are far
too low, there is little agreement on how this proportion is increased.
Several countries have initiated quota rules in order to promote female board representation in listed
companies. Norway requires that 40 per cent of the directors of a listed company (ASA) are women and similar
initiatives have been launched e.g. in Spain, see Adams & Ferreira (2009) for an overview. Different countries
have formulated different models. For instance, in France the aim is also 40 percent female board representation,
but this rule applies not only listed companies, but also to large and publicly owned companies. In Norway, the
ultimate sanction is dissolution of a company through court if a company does not comply with the quota
required. Sanctions have not yet been determined in France. Instead, in a French context, a decision to appoint a
male for the board may be deemed unlawfully. In order to avoid that companies reincorporate by altering its
articles of incorporation so that a company is not bound by the rules, some countries such as Spain require all
companies to comply with the quota rules no matter their legal statues where the rules are to be fully
implemented over a transition period of eight years. In other countries e.g. Finland and Denmark, the issue of
board diversity has been addressed explicitly in the national Corporate Governance codes i.e. as soft law.
One may argue that granting women a certain proportion of the seats of the board can be equivalent to an
affirmative action that may violate basic principles of proportionality, i.e. the aim could be reached with less
intrusive interventions, which is a basic principle e.g. in the EC treaty (article 157, No. 4).
From a democratic perspective one may advocate for a more equal distribution of board seats, as the
corporate board is the highest-ranking decision body in companies. However, more importantly, one may justify
increased demands on diversity if corporations hereby can influence performance positively, i.e. if there is a
positive bottom line effect. This article contributes to this debate. Furthermore, we also explicitly analyze the
performance impact based on citizenship as well as other factors such as size of the board.
Imposing quota rules stands in contrast with the fundamental premise of property rights since it is the
owners who bear the entire risk of the company if it goes into financial distress, hence shareholders should have
the prerogative to decide for themselves, see Demsetz and Lehn (1985).
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
Board diversity has been explored in a number of studies. Recently, Carter et al. (2010) examine not only
the impact of increasing the proportion of women but also the effect of ethnic minority directors on boards. The
authors conduct a comprehensive study based on 2.563 companies covering a five-year period of the S&P-index
firms. Performance is measured by ROA as well as Tobins Q. Besides dealing with the issue of causality using
the traditional Hausman test of endogeneity, the authors include a number of corporate governance variables
such as meeting attendance, average age, CEO-Chair duality etc. However, Carter et al (2010) does not find a
significant link between firm performance (bottom line effect) and gender or ethnic background.
Overall, the results that link gender to financial performance have been mixed. Campbell and Minguez-
Vera (2008) conduct a study based on Spanish companies from 1995-2000 covering non-financial firms at the
Madrid stock exchange. Firm performance is measured by Tobins Q, which focuses on expectations of future
performance as well as ROA. Using 2SLS Campbell and Minquez-Vera find a significant positive relation
between corporate performance and the proportion of Spanish female board members. As a natural
consequence, they argue that increased gender diversity can be achieved without destroying shareholder value,
which supports Spain’s Unified Good Governance Code 2006 that recommends positive discrimination in favor
of female boardroom appointment.
Randøy et al. (2006) has analyzed board diversity from a Nordic perspective. They study board diversity
and its impact on corporate performance in the largest 500 companies from Denmark, Norway and Sweden.
They find no significant diversity effect of gender, age and nationality on stock market performance or ROA.
Randøy et al. conclude that if increased diversity along these lines is attractive per se or as a matter of political
preference, it can be achieved without shareholder value destruction. However, if board size increases due to the
recruitment of more director diversity there will be an indirect cost in terms of value destruction.
Rose (2007) not only studies board diversity, but also educational background of board members. Based on
a sample of all Danish listed companies he finds that educational background does not impact corporate
performance, which is also the case for the proportion of female as well as non-nationals in Danish boards. He
argues that board members with an unconventional background are socialized unconsciously and adopting the