Int. Journal of Business Science and Applied Management / Business-and-Management.org
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documents that the vast majority of the firms simply complies with the recommendation i.e. they do very often
explain why a firm has deviated from “best practice”.
The only exception is the recommendation that a firm must explain not only its capital structure, but also its
share structure e.g. if a firm has an ownership/voting ceiling, shares with dual class voting rights etc. see Rose
(2002) for a description of Danish takeover defenses.
This article combines the insight from institutional knowledge, in this case about Denmark with a sound
statistical analysis, which is quite rare in the literature. This enables one to get a better understanding of the
underlying structure of the firms reported transparency level as well as how different recommendations may be
classified into distinct sections. This approach may guide code drafters in a systematic way thereby improving
the quality of firm’s transparency communication.
This article demonstrates that the current classification of the Danish stakeholder recommendations needs
to be revisited. This article has demonstrated a way in which this can be done in the future. This implies that one
needs to build on a multidisciplinary approach that combines institutional/legal insight with multivariate
statistics. The latter discipline involves a whole range of different methods, but this article has shown that;
principal, factor as well as cluster analysis may be used as building blocks for such an analysis.
Transparency is a necessary precondition for creating trust among outside investors and top management,
as the presence of asymmetric information may create agency costs. When investors get a clearer picture of
firms corporate governance structure, in particular how a firm deals with its key stakeholders, they are more
inclined to believe that management serves the interests of the company. However, too many specific
recommendations may create a false sense of trust, as there is a risk that the board of directors may view the
process as a “tick the box” exercise. The consequence is that stakeholder transparency is not taken seriously
enough but instead appears as “empty words”. As a result, outside investors need to have a clear picture of how
a firm complies with the specific recommendations as well as how the recommendations are implemented in
practice. If corporate governance is to be applied in a sound manner creating added value for all parties, it is
crucial that investors feel that the recommendations are classified in a meaningful way. This article has
presented a systemic methodology for this task which can be generalized to other countries.
The future research implications of the articles findings as well as methodology are twofold. First, it seems
likely that the outlined methodology can be successfully used in order to quantify the degree of corporate
governance compliance. This entails that we will get a more reliable picture of the compliance level and that this
knowledge can be compared across countries. Secondly, in order to better understand the mechanisms and
nature of transparency, this article has shown that cluster analysis may a fruitful methodology, which may be
used more frequently than standard regression models. One the other hand, one should also acknowledge that
there are some research limitations. It may be difficult to compare across countries with different jurisdictions
and institutions. To illustrate, the shareholder value doctrine is well recognized in the US, whereas in continental
Europe, there is a broader acceptance that listed firms should also take into account the interests of other
stakeholders than the owners
The findings of the article also have managerial implications. The knowledge of what is considered best
practice in relation to transparency and stakeholder communication is vital when a firm wants to enter into a
dialogue with all its stakeholders. To illustrate, 15 % of the firms in the article’s sample explain poorly their
stakeholder policy. As a consequence, it will become more difficult to communicate and create relations with
stakeholders due to the absence of a clear and trustworthy stakeholder communication. This is especially the
case if a firm explains poorly in relation to its CSR policy.
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